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This note comments on Perotti’s (2008) estimates of the impact of a government
spending shock on the economy. In the process, it makes two points. First, it notes
that with enough freedom to pick the dynamics of policy variables, the neoclassical
model can generate any set of observations for the non-policy variables. Second, it
proposes a method to identify the policy dynamics in theoretical models by using the
estimated impulse responses of the policy variables from VARs, and in this way generate
testable predictions of the model for the non-policy variables.
∗This paper is forthcoming as a comment on Perotti (2008) in the NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2007.
1How should economists compare the predictions of a dynamic model with the data? A
currently popular answer to this perennial question is to plot the impulse response functions
of some variables to shocks, and compare the responses predicted by the model to those
estimated in the data. This approach is simple, intuitive, and even fairly comprehensive
since impulse responses contain a great deal of information. For a linear (or linearized)
model with constant variances, the impulse response functions summarize all of the model’s
dynamics, and for covariance-stationary data, they capture all of the second-order properties
of the data. Impulse responses have allowed economists to move from focusing solely on
variances and covariances into assessing ﬁner features like persistence, sluggishness, hump
shapes, and lead-lag relations.
In practice, one diﬃculty with this methodology is how to estimate the empirical impulse
responses. In the study of monetary policy, research has used vector autoregressions (VARs)
and this is the recent growing approach in the study of ﬁscal policy. Perotti gives a thorough
and insightful survey of this work, focusing on the impulse responses of output, hours,
consumption, and real wages to government-spending shocks. These have led to a debate
and a challenge.
The debate is between Ramey and Shapiro on one side, and Blanchard and Perotti
himself on the other. All agree that output and hours rise following an exogenous expansion
in government spending, but while Ramey and Shapiro ﬁnd that consumption and real wages
fall, Blanchard and Perotti ﬁnd that they rise. Because these opposite results come from
diﬀerent empirical strategies to identify shocks to government sending, one “narrative” that
uses war build-ups as exogenous dates, and the other “structural” that assumes government
spending responds with a lag to other shocks, this has led to a more general debate on the
relative merits of these two methods. Furthermore, Ramey and Shapiro’s results are used
to support the neoclassical model, while Blanchard and Perotti’s are used to support the
Keynesian model, so they become involved in the more general debate of what is the best
model of economic ﬂuctuations.
The challenge is that, if Blanchard and Perotti are right, it is hard to understand the rise
in consumption following the increase in government spending for two reasons. First, since
more government consumption uses resources and lowers private wealth, any model with
as i g n i ﬁcant role for the permanent-income hypothesis will predict a fall in consumption.
Second, since with standard parameters, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
2and consumption rises signiﬁcantly with the increase in hours but the wage only slightly
changes, so for households to be on their labor supply and the two to be equal, consumption
must fall. One answer to this challenge is, of course, the old-fashioned IS-LM model since
it violates the permanent-income hypothesis and has hours determined by labor demand,
not supply. But more modern models, whether neoclassical or new-Keynesian, whether
real or monetary, fail at the challenge. One exception is Gali, López-Salido and Valles’s
(2007) “truly-Keynesian” model where there are not only pricing frictions but also a large
group of Keynesian hand-to-mouth consumers (who consume more with the rise in income
counteracting the wealth eﬀect) and Keynesian labor markets where unions sets hours and
wages (so these are determined by labor demand not supply).
In this comment, I discuss the use of VAR evidence to test models via impulse responses.
There has been an intense debate on the merits and ﬂa w so fV A R sa te s t i m a t i n gi m p u l s e
responses.1 Here, I am actually going to assume that Perotti’s estimates are exactly right.
Instead, I will focus on the use of these estimates to distinguish between models.
1. An aside into monetary policy and anticipated policy
Before I start, it is worthwhile taking a short detour into the literature on monetary
policy to make an observation inspired by Cochrane (1998). Imagine that 3 researchers
estimated the response of output and a policy variable (say an interest rate) to an exogenous
contraction in policy. All three found the same output response, in the left panel of ﬁgure
1, but each found a diﬀerent response of the policy variable, in the right panel of the ﬁgure.
Would they reach the same conclusion if they were interested in testing a theory of output
ﬂuctuations?
If that theory stated that only unanticipated policy matters, as in the classical models of
Lucas and Barro, the answer is yes. All three estimated the same instantaneous impact on
the policy variable, and that is all that matters for output. The path of policy afterwards
is anticipated so it is neutral, whether it goes up, down, or stays the same.
If, however, they were examining a modern sticky-price model, the answer is no. In
this model, the anticipated policy path after the shock aﬀects by how much adjusting ﬁrms
change their prices, which in turn aﬀects by how much output falls. Each of the responses
of the policy variable on the right side of the ﬁg u r ew o u l dl e a dt oad i ﬀerent response of
1In the Macro Annual conference alone, see Gali and Rabanal (2005) McGrattan (2005) Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Vigfussonl (2007) and Kehoe (2007).
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output, so only one (if any) could be consistent with the output response in the left side.
In modern models of nominal rigidities, policy rules matter, and the response of policy
variables to policy shocks provides information on these policy rules.
In the study of ﬁscal policy, anticipated policy also matters and, if anything, even more.
Most ﬁscal policy changes are announced a few quarters in advance and they tend to persist,
so ﬁscal policy is quite predictable. Moreover, changes in government spending typically
come with future changes in ﬁscal policy to balance the budget (and intense debates on
the best way to do it). And lastly, in models with intertemporal substitution, future ﬁscal
policy aﬀects relative trade-oﬀs and therefore behavior in the present.
2. A neoclassical model of ﬁscal policy

















t )Ct + Kt+1 = Rt+1Kt + WtNt + Tt,
where Ct is consumption and τC
t a consumption tax, Nt hours worked and Wt their after-tax
wage, Kt the capital stock and Rt the after-tax return on renting it, and Tt are lump-sum




















t is the tax rate on labor and τK
t the tax rate on capital (with no depreciation
exemption). Finally, the economy’s resource constraint and total output Yt are:




Total government spending is Gt and a fraction σ of it is used in the public sector to generate
output, while the remaining 1−σ is wasted or provides welfare through some additive extra
term in the utility function.2 The government chooses {Gt,τC
t ,τN
t ,τK
t } and Tt ensures a
balanced budget every period.
This model has a steady-state where all variables are constant. It is described by 4
non-linear equations relating the 4 endogenous variables that Perotti wants to focus on,
{Y,N,C,W},t ot h e4p o l i c yv a r i a b l e s ,{G,τC,τN,τK}. My only assumption on the para-
meters is that the steady-state endogenous variables are positive. Evaluating the Jacobian
determinant of this system at the point where all policy variables are zero:3
Proposition 1: There is (locally) a one-to-one relation between (Y,N,C,W) and (G,τC,τN,τK).
Therefore, given an appropriate choice of ﬁscal policy, the neoclassical model can gen-
erate any steady state that you want. This result is not surprising: observations of average
output, hours, consumption and wages (properly scaled with growth) convey no information
on the validity of the neoclassical model.
To study the predicted response to government-spending shocks, one must specify the
dynamics of the shocks and the ﬁscal policy rules. I assume the shock follows an AR(1),
at = ρat−1 + εt. Letting small letters denote the log of the respective capital letter relative
to its steady state, the ﬁscal policy rules are:
gt = γGct +( 1+λG)at,
τC
t = γCct + λCgt,
τN
t = γNct + λNgt,
τK
t = γKct + λKgt.
2For simplicity, this assumes that the public-sector’s output is a perfect substitute for private-sector’s
output, so there is only one consumption good.
3All results are proven in an appendix available from my website: http://www.princeton.edu/~rreis.
5Total government spending responds to a 1% ﬁscal shock by (1 + λG)%, and it is cyclical,
adjusting to the level of consumption. Tax rates are also cyclical and respond to move-
ments in government spending. These ﬁscal policy rules may not be optimal or realistic
for developed economies, but they are plausible and roughly capture the cyclicality of ﬁscal
policy and the interaction between taxes and spending.4 There are 8 policy-rule parameters:
π =( γG,γC,γN,γK,λ G,λ C,λ N,λ K).
The log-linear approximate solution of the model implies an ARMA(2,1) structure for
the impulse response to an εt shock:
(1 − η(π)L)(1− ρL)xt= μx(π)εt + νx(π)εt−1
where xt is either yt,n t,c t or wt. The autoregressive coeﬃcients are common to all vari-
ables, so diﬀerences in dynamics depend on the 8 moving-average coeﬃcients φ(π)=
(μy,νy,μ n,νn,μ c,νc,μ w,νw), which are functions of the policy parameters.
The neoclassical model’s predictions for the variables are interest are fully described by
φ(π). If Perotti’s estimates ﬁt this ARMA(2,1) structure, then he has eﬀectively estimated
ˆ φ. Asking if the neoclassical model ﬁts the data then amounts to asking whether ˆ φ is close
to φ(π).P e r o t t i ﬁnds that ˆ μc > 0 and ˆ μw > 0 and argues that the neoclassical model
predicts the opposite signs, so he concludes against it. However, in the neighborhood of the
point where all the elements of π are zero, and for conventional parameter values:5
Proposition 2: There is (locally) a one-to-one relation between π and φ(π).
That is, whatever were Perotti’s estimated impulse responses of output, hours, consumption
and wages, they are consistent with a neoclassical model with an appropriate choice of policy
rules. Perotti’s conclusion came from arbitrarily assuming that all the elements of π are
zero. But, with freedom to pick the policy-rule parameters in π, the result on steady states
applies also to the model’s dynamics. No set of impulse responses could ever reject the
model.
It is important to not over-state this result. This is not a claim that anything goes in
the neoclassical model, nor is it necessarily speciﬁc to the neoclassical versus other dynamic
models. The point is instead that looking only at a few impulse responses and having a lot
4For a careful empirical study of this interaction, see Romer and Romer (2007).
5The parameter values are β =0 .99, θ =1 , ψ =4 ,α=0 .34,δ=0 .025,σ G / Y =0 .12, G/Y =0 .21,
τ
K =0 .54, and ρ =0 .8. See the appendix for explanations.
6of leeway to pick policy rules gives so much freedom that it leads to no predictions. This
problem is familiar to empirical VARs, but here reversed on its head to apply to theoretical
models: identiﬁcation.
3. Identiﬁcation in the neoclassical model
In principle, identiﬁcation in a theoretical model can follow the same strategies used in
empirical estimation. For instance, it is popular in the literature on VARs to impose timing
restrictions. These have a direct counterpart in the model. To see how they work, note
that the neoclassical model has two static optimality conditions, one from the household’s













Now, imagine imposing the restrictions that the tax rates on consumption and labor income
adjust only with a one-quarter delay to changes in spending. Then, these two conditions
will pin down the impact response of two of (Yt,N t,C t,W t) as a function of the other two,
independently of the policy-rule parameters. Proposition 2 will no longer hold, and the
model has testable predictions on the impact response to spending shocks.
Another approach is to use institutional restrictions, using the details of how taxes are
set in a country to learn about some of the policy-rule parameters directly (Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002). In principle, one could impose exactly the same identifying restrictions
on both the VAR and the model, solving both the empirical and theoretical identiﬁcation
problems in a coherent way.
I would like to propose a third approach to identiﬁcation that uses the impulse responses
of policy variables to policy shocks. These responses trace out the policy dynamics. The
researcher can use them to pin down the policy rule parameters, tying his or her hands
before looking at the impulse responses of the non-policy variables. In the model above,
this would amount to using the estimated impulse responses of (gt,τC
t ,τN
t ,τK
t )t op i nd o w n
the policy-rule parameters. The resulting ˆ π can then be fed into φ(ˆ π) and compared with
the empirical estimates ˆ φ.
7This strategy accomplishes the coherence in identiﬁcation between estimates and model,
because the estimated impulse responses of the policy variables respect the empirical iden-
tifying assumptions by construction. When it is hard to map the empirical identifying
restrictions to their theoretical counterparts, this procedure accomplishes it directly. More-
over, when the empirical identifying restrictions are not suﬃcient to identify the model,
the policy-variables impulse responses include new information from the data to achieve
identiﬁcation.
To see this approach in action, I pursued an example using Perotti’s baseline SVAR
estimates with U.S. data from 1947. Because there are only two policy variables in his
baseline VAR, government spending and an income tax, I consider a simpler version of the




and consider only the impulse responses of output and consumption. I solve the model for
the theoretical impulse responses of gt and τt, which follow the ARMA(2,1) structure above
with 4 moving-average parameters. I pin down the 4 policy-rule parameters to match as
closely as possible the ﬁrst 16 elements of the empirical impulse responses of gt and τt.
Figure 2 shows the reasonably good match.
Using these policy-rule parameters, I then solve for the theoretical impulse responses
of yt and ct and compare them to their empirical counterparts in ﬁgure 3. There are
three results to note. First, after an expansion in spending, consumption rises on impact.
Contrary to Perotti’s claim, rising consumption is consistent with the neoclassical model.
The reason is that in Perotti’s estimates in ﬁgure 2, when spending rises, taxes rise and are
expected to fall in the future. Households therefore realize it is relatively less rewarding to
work today rather than in the future and so cut hours. Since consumption and leisure are
complements, this pushes consumption up.
The second thing to note is that output also falls on impact. This example illustrates
the perils of not taking into account the identiﬁcation of the model. Perotti contrasted
his estimates with the predictions of falling consumption and rising output coming from a
neoclassical model where all the policy-rule parameter are equal to zero. In fact, given the
policy rules for government spending and income taxes that he estimated, the neoclassical
model predicts the opposite, a fall in output and a rise in consumption on impact.
The third result is that the neoclassical model is at odds with the facts. While con-
sumption rises on impact in both data and theory, it stays positive in the former but falls to
8Figure 2: Impulse responses of taxes and government spending























Figure 3: Impulse responses of income and consumption























9negative in the latter. And the output response is positive in the data but negative in the
theory at all horizons. In general, the theory predictions are quite far from the empirical
conﬁdence bands.
4. Conclusion
Perotti has done a tour de force on the diﬃcult and important issue of estimating and
identifying empirical impulse responses to government spending shocks. He used these
estimates in part to test models and this comment focused on this application.
I have tried to make two points that apply more generally than to his paper. The ﬁrst
is well-known: policy rules and anticipated policy matter for the dynamics of intertemporal
models. The second is perhaps less appreciated: theoretical models can suﬀer from identiﬁ-
cation problems that are as serious as those in empirical estimates. The theorist has many
degrees of freedom in building his or her model, and some of the most important are the
most diﬃcult to pin down, the policy rules.
To be constructive, I proposed an approach to identify the theoretical model. It uses
the empirical impulse responses of the policy variables to the policy shocks as a summary
of both the data and the VAR’s identiﬁcation conditions to identify the policy rules in the
model. Then, it compares the theoretical impulse responses for the non-policy variables with
their empirical counterparts.6 When I applied this method to compare Perotti’s empirical
estimates with those of a neoclassical model, I agreed with him that they seem inconsistent,
but for very diﬀerent reasons.
The typical debate on structural VARs focuses on how one can use information from
models to help estimate and identify VARs. But, sometimes, the reverse can also be true:
one can use information from VARs to help formulate and identify models.
6Aside from the well-established practice of picking model parameters to ﬁt estimated impulse responses
(e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005), there are two closer antecedents to this approach. Both
also abide by the general principle that the policymaker’s policy-rule parameters in the model are chosen to
match the empirical impulse response function of the policy variables, but they impose stricter restrictions
on the policy rules. Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fischer (1999) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fischer (2004)
assume the policy rules for government spending and taxes are a moving average of the exogenous ﬁscal
shocks, without any feedback from endogenous variables, and pick the moving-average parameters to match
their VAR empirical estimates. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) make timing assumptions on monetary
policy that ensure that the policy rule parameters can be identiﬁed from the VAR estimates without having
to specify the rest of the model.
10Appendix
This appendix deﬁnes the competitive equilibrium of the neoclassical economy, proves
propositions 1 and 2 and outlines the calculations behind ﬁgures 2 and 3. The proofs of
the propositions use an analytical-derivatives program (Mathematica) and the calculations
for the ﬁgures use a numerical-computation software (Matlab). All programs are available
from my website.
The neoclassical economy: In a competitive equilibrium, households and ﬁrms behave
optimally and markets clear. Dropping the time index from variables and letting a subscript









W = κNψC−θ(1 + τC).
The ﬁrm’s optimality conditions and a 0-proﬁt condition imply:
W =( 1 − τN)(1 − α)(K/N)
α
R =( 1 − τK)[α(N/K)
1−α +1− δ]
and the production function and resource constraint serve as the relevant market-clearing
conditions:
K0 =( 1 − δ)K + Y − C − G
Y = KαN1−α + σG
These 6 equations, together with a transversality condition form consumer optimization,
initial values for the capital stock and shocks, and the policy rules in the main text, deﬁne
the competitive equilibrium of the model.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :At the steady-state, the Euler equation implies that R =1 /β
and the deﬁnition of output implies that (K/N)α =( Y − σG)/N. Using these two results
to replace out R and K from the remaining 4 equations for equilibrium, gives a system of 4
non-linear equations in the 4 endogenous variables {Y,N,C,W} and the 4 policy variables
11{G,τC,τN,τK}:
W = κNψC−θ(1 + τC),



















+ C + G
The determinant of the Jacobian of this system evaluated at the point where all elements
of {G,τC,τN,τK} are zero is (computed by Mathematica):
[αY +( 1− δ)K][(α − σ)Y + σC]
α(θ + ψ)
.
For the system to be one-to-one, this expression must not be zero. The ﬁrst term in brackets
in the denominator is non-zero as is the numerator. The second term in brackets in the





, so this condition will hold as long as (σ−1)δ 6= β−1−1.
Since the left-hand side is negative, but the right-hand side is positive, this must hold.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Log-linearizing the system of equations describing the competi-




− τC − E
¡
r0¢
w = τC + ψn+ θc
w = −τN + α(k − n)
r = −τK + Ξ(1 − α)(n − k)
k0 =( 1 − δ)k +( Y/K)y − (C/K)c − (G/K)g,
y =( 1 − σG/Y)(αk +( 1− α)n)+( σG/Y)g
where Ξ−1 =1+( 1 − δ)/[(Y/K)(1 − σG/Y)]. These 6 equations, together with the 4
policy rules in the main text provide the linear laws of motion for {c, y, n, k, r, w, g, τC,
τK, τN}. At any date, the two state variables are the current values of capital k and the
12shock a. A solution to this system of 10 linear stochastic diﬀerence equation therefore has
the form:
k0 = ηk + Ha
x = Axk + Bxa,
where xt is either yt,n t,c t or wt.T h ec o e ﬃcients η, H, Ax,a n dBx are messy functions of
all the parameters that are easily computed by Mathematica. Recalling that a0 = ρa + ε,
the solution above implies that x follows the ARMA(2,1) processes in the text with μx = Bx
and νx = AxH − Bxη.
This sequence of steps gives a linear map φ(π). This relation is one-to-one if there is an
inverse map, which can be assessed by seeing whether the smallest eigenvalue in absolute
value is above zero. I evaluate this for the following set of parameter values: β =0 .99,
so that in the steady-state the annual real interest rate is approximately 4%, θ =1 ,s o
the utility function is logarithmic in consumption, ψ =4 , the high Frisch elasticity of
labor supply that is commonly chosen in the literature on business cycles, α =0 .34 so the
capital share is 34% of private income, δ =0 .025, so the annual depreciation rate is 10%,
σG/Y =0 .12 to match the U.S. annual average in 1929-2006 according to NIPA Table
1.3.5, G/Y =0 .21 to match the U.S. annual average in 1929-2006 according to NIPA Table
1.1.5, τK =0 .54, the average tax rate on capital estimated by Poterba (1998) for the U.S.
in the period 1959-1996, ρ =0 .8, so the shock to spending has a serial correlation of 0.8,
and all the elements of π are zero. The smallest eigenvalue in absolute value is 0.002, so
the map is one-to-one.
Calculations behind ﬁgures 2 and 3: The log-linearized model is the same as in the
proof of proposition 2, but now τC
t =0 , τN
t = τK
t = τt and τt = γTct+λTgt. Therefore, the
same argument used in the proof of proposition 2 implies that τ and g follow ARMA(2,1)
processes with MA coeﬃcients (μτ,ντ,μ g,νg) that depend on the model’s parameters. In
particular, they depend on the four policy parameters π =( γG,γT,λ G,λ T). Setting the
structural parameters at the same values as in the proof of Proposition 2, then each choice of
values for these 4 policy parameters implies values for the ARMA coeﬃcients, which in turn
imply values for the impulse response functions of taxes τ(t) and government spending g(t).





(g(t) − ˆ g(t))




This provides the estimated ˆ π. Using these plus the structural parameters in the proof
of proposition 2, I evaluate (μy, νy,μ c, νc) using the functions deﬁn e di np r o p o s i t i o n2 ,a n d
calculate the implied impulse responses. I scale the theoretical impulse responses so that
their sum is the same as the one for the empirical impulse responses.
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